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Political, Military, and Economic Dynamics in Iraq: A Graphic Overview

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The Iraq Challenge

- May have to leave Iraq suddenly for political reasons, but best strategy is caution.
- Need to seek to contain or limit Iran, resolve Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish issue, and reassure Sunni allies have not abandoned Iraqi Sunnis.
- If surge succeeds, and conciliation happens, need to phase out US forces at rate that best achieves Iraqi and regional stability.
- If fails, need phased cuts tied to clear political efforts, aid, and option of seeking to bloc civil war turning into military bloodbath.
- Need to reassure key allies that will not leave Gulf, will aid them in dealing with Iran, and seeking some form of stability in Iraq.
- Need clear basing plans.


Iraqi Governorates




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Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions




Iraqi Oil Fields by Governorate




Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends

1 October 2004 – 7 September 2007




High Profile Attacks



As of 31 AUG 07; High Profile = Car bombs + suicide car bombs + suicide vests

Improvised Explosive Devices




Total IEDs = IED explosions + IEDs found + IED hoaxes

Major Threats to Iraq




Baghdad Neighborhoods




Ethno-Sectarian Violence



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

FEB 07



MAY 07



AUG 07



Density plots are of incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs


Southern Baghdad




Diyala




Al Anbar & Iraq




Insurgents in Anbar




Sunni Response in Anbar




Al Anbar: Iraqi 7th Division




Al Anbar: Iraqi 1st Division



Al Anbar: Police Services



Al Anbar: Iraqi DBE



Tribal Engagement



Overall Attack Patterns in MNF-I West


Weekly Incident Totals 1 yr

Unclassified


98 Incidents this week

157 is the 8 week average


257 is the 26 week average




Civilian Tips in MNF-I West: July 2007






Incident Cycles in MNF-I West



Incidents by Initiator in MNF-I West



Anbar Attacks




Density plots are of locations where attacks occurred


Decline in Attacks by City

Jul 05 - Jun 07


Fallujah




Rutbah




Hit




Hadithah Triad



Threat Reduction in Ramadi




Iraqi Security Force Capabilities




Iraqi Army Battalions, National Police Battalions, and Special Operating Force Battalions


Recommended Force Reductions/Mission Shift



Iraq: US Aid Status




The Electricity Problem




Daily electricity demand August 1-7 was 20 percent above the same period in 2006. Daily supply from the electricity grid was 12 percent below 2006; it met 43 percent of total electricity demand, compared with 58 percent for the year-earlier period.

Average hours of power via electricity grid after meeting demand from essential services: Baghdad 4.9 and nationwide 9.3. Year-ago levels were Baghdad 6.3 hours and nationwide 10.7 hours.

Crude Oil Production




Crude Oil Revenues



- 2006 Revenue Estimate: \$31.3 Billion
- 2007 Revenue Estimate: \$19.3 Billion (Year to Date)

Product Import Dependence



Note: This is a daily average for July 30 – August 5


- Diesel: 10.8 ML supply of 24.5 ML target
- Kerosene: 3.3 ML supply of 11.1 ML target
- Gasoline: 9.1 ML supply of 23.1 ML target
- LPG: 1,630 tons supply of 5,100 tons target

Iraqi Oil Infrastructure



Iraqi Oil Production

June 2006 – August 2007



Source: DoD. "Measuring Security and Stability on Iraq" September 14, 2007. Pg. 12

Note: +/- 5%

Iraqi Oil Fields

The thirst for Iraqi oil


While U.S. oil firms have stood on the sidelines, Iraq has negotiated contracts or had serious talks with oil companies from many other nations to develop its vast oil reserves. The map shows some of the major fields and the countries involved.



Source: U.S. Department of Energy, American Petroleum Institute

Times art

Oil and Gas Resources in Anbar




This map of Iran illustrates the distribution of oil and gas resources. Major oil fields are highlighted in pink, including LALI, MASJED-E SOLEYMAN, PARE-SIAH, NAFT-E SAFID, HAFT GEL, KUPAL, MARON, DUDROW, KUH-E RIG, SHUROM, MANSUREH, AGHA JARI, RAMSHIR, KARENI, PAZANAN, GACHSARAN, RAG-E SAFID, BAHREGAN SAR, HENDJAN, BINAQ, NOW RIZ, ARDESHIR, SIRUS, FEREYDUN, and BIEI HAKIMEH. The main oil pipeline is shown as a black line with dots, connecting these fields to the Persian Gulf. Main gas pipelines are indicated by blue lines with arrows. Petroleum refineries are marked with black icons, and petrochemical plants are marked with black icons. The map also shows the continental shelf boundary and a scale bar in kilometers and miles.

Iran & Iraq as Case Studies

Demand for Total Liquids vs. Price

(Millions of Barrels Per Day - Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2007,



Average world oil prices in 2030 are \$36, \$59, and \$100 per barrel in 2030